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We consider the impact of merger on the equilibrium price and
quality of products. Consumer demand for both products depends
not only on own price and quality, but also on the price and quality
of the other product. We consider both the case in which the merging
ﬁrms produce gross complements, and the case in which the ﬁrms
produce gross substitutes. In both cases, merger may lower or increase
both product price and quality. In the case in which ﬁrms produce
complementary products, it may happen that ﬁrms both lower price
and increase product quality when merged. This happens when the
cross quality elasticities of demand and the cross price elasticities of
demand are equal in magnitude. Surprisingly, we also ﬁnd that there
are situations under which merger between ﬁrms producing substitutes
increases welfare. For example, it is possible that merger between ﬁrms
producing gross complements may result in higher product quality but
lower social welfare, and merger between ﬁrms producing substitute
products may result in lower product quality but higher social welfare.1 Introduction
In both theory and practice, the assessment of merger is usually based upon
comparing the potential anti-competitive eﬀects of merger with the potential
eﬃciency gains of merger. Merger may result in welfare gains because of
improvements in management eﬃciency or realization of scale economies.1
Since Williamson’s (1968) classic analysis, the literature is replete with recent
papers analyzing the welfare impacts of mergers, see for example, Willig,
Salop and Sherer (1991), J. Baker and Bresnahan (1985), and Farrell and
Shapiro (1990). For a recent review of literature on mergers, see Cabral
(2003) or Pesendorfer (2003).
In spite of its importance, the analysis of merger has largely ignored the
impact of merger on product quality, and the resulting welfare eﬀects of
merger. While there is is a substantial literature on merger and the quality
of inputs provided by merging ﬁrms, this literature ignores the eﬀects that
merger may have on the quality of products actually purchased and consumed
by consumers.2
A sizable portion of mergers have occurred in industries in which the
impact of merger on product quality is likely to be of central importance:
health care, airlines, and ﬁnancial services are three prominent examples.
Indeed, it is commonplace to include some measure of quality in empirical
work on the impact of merger.3
Our analysis is aimed at assessing the impact of merger on welfare when
ﬁrms are free to choose product quality. Our methodology admits some
other methodological extensions. In addition to studying the familiar case
of horizontal merger in which ﬁrms produce substitute products, we also
consider the case in which ﬁrms produce complementary products. In these
two environments, we reassess the conventional wisdom concerning merger
1See Schmalensee (1987), who also discusses some practical diﬃculties in assessing these
features of merger and the evolution of policy over time.
2See, for example, Bian’s and McFetridge’s (2000) analysis of the eﬃciencies defense.
3On merger in health care markets and quality, see Ho and Hamilton (2000) or Gaynor
and Haas-Wilson (1999). Carlton, Landes, and Posner (1980) study airline mergers and
the impact on service quality, and Berger, Kashyap, Scalise, Gertler, and Friedman (1995)
study mergers in the banking and ﬁnancial services industry.For additional discussion of
the practical relevance of quality in merger, see Fisher and Lande (1983, 1989), who note
that the eﬀects of a merger on quality, in addition to the impact of merger on product
variety and innovation, may be as important as economic eﬃciencies or cost savings, but
are perhaps just as diﬃcult to predict.
1and welfare.4 Do mergers tend to increase or decrease product qualities
when merged, and how are consumers, and social welfare, aﬀected by these
changes?5
The problem is a rich theoretical one due to the nuances of models in
which ﬁrms select price and quality. In monopoly models of this sort, it
is not obvious how the monopolist’s proﬁt maximizing price and quality
deviate from socially optimal price and quality. Spence (1975) showed that a
monopolist choosing both product quality and price generally sets price above
marginal cost, but that the ﬁrm may choose a quality that is higher or lower
than the welfare maximizing quality. The end result is that the monopolist
may choose to produce too much or too little quality, at too high or too
low a price.6 The eﬀect causing the ﬁrm to diverge from welfare-maximizing
quality is subtle. The monopolist considers the impact of quality choice on
the marginal consumer, while welfare maximization requires consideration of
the impact of quality choice on all consumers.7
In spite of these diﬃculties, we are able to characterize the conditions
under which merger increases price, decreases quality, or both. We ﬁnd that
there are circumstances under which merger increases welfare and that this
occurrence is in some sense more likely, but not exclusive to the case in
which ﬁrms producing complementary products. Ultimately, the impact of
merger on welfare depends upon the relative magnitudes of cross price and
cross quality demand elasticities. If neither elasticity is too large relative
to the other (which occurs when quality and price are equally important to
consumers), the merged entity faces conﬂicting incentives in trying to raise
price and reduce product quality, and may therefore both reduce price and
raise quality. Interestingly, the converse of this argument applies in the case
in which ﬁrms produce substitutes: merger is most likely to produce a lose-
4The case of horizontal merger between ﬁrms producing complements is certainly not
as well known as the study of horizontal merger between ﬁrms which produce substitutes.
Economides and Salop (1992, p. 106) develop an extensive analysis of the complementary
merger and summarize the relevant economic principle as follows: ”...two independent
ﬁrms ignore the eﬀect of their independent markups on each other, while the monopolist
internalizes this externality.”
5While we refer throughout to merger between the ﬁrms, our analysis would apply
equally well to joint ventures.
6See Sheshinski (1976) for additional details of the model. Tirole (1988) and Wolfstetter
(1999) contain abbreviated expositions of models of this sort.
7Spence (1975) characterized this as a divergence between marginal willingness to pay
for quality and average willingness to pay for quality.
2lose scenario for consumers - higher prices and lower product quality - when
cross elasticities are relatively equal in magnitude.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the
model and discuss the direct and magnitude of changes in product price and
quality due to merger, and the impact of merger on consumers’ surplus and
welfare. Section 3 concludes.
2 The Model
There are two ﬁrms, 1 and 2. Let si denote product quality, pi price, and xi
quantity for i = 1,2. Firms’ average and marginal costs of producing a good
of quality si are ci(si), c0
i > 0,c00
i > 0. Demand for ﬁrm i’s product is
x
d
i = xi(pi,pj,si,sj); i,j = 1,2.



















meaning that as the price of good j rises, the quantity demanded of good
i falls, while if the quality of good j rises, the quantity of good i demand










As the price of good j rises, the quantity demanded of good i increases, while
if the quality of good j rises, the quantity demanded of good i falls.8
8We do not consider the cases in which goods are, for instance, quality complements
but quantity substitutes. It is diﬃcult to think of real world examples of these types of
goods. However, see Sheshinski (1976).
3Let the indicator variable δ take on a value of one if ﬁrms are merged,
and a value of zero if ﬁrms are autonomous. Then, ﬁrm i’s proﬁts can be
written
πi = xi(pi,pj,si,sj)(pi − ci(si)) +
δxj(pj,pi,si,sj)(pj − cj(sj)),
i,j = 1,2. (1)
Maximization of (1) with respect to price and quality yields, respectively,
the ﬁrst order conditions
xi,pi(pi − ci) + xi + δxj,pi(pj − cj) = 0, (2)
and
xi,si(pi − ci) + xic
0
i + δxj,si(pj − cj) = 0. (3)
It is evident from comparing equations (2) and (3) that ﬁrms choose
diﬀerent quality and price combinations when merged than they would when
autonomous. To obtain explicit solutions to the ﬁrst order conditions (2)
and (3), we assume the following:
1. Firms have identical cost and demand functions, and thus can be
treated symmetrically in equilibrium.
2. Average costs of producing a given quality s are linear and are given
by c(s) = c + css for both ﬁrms.












The parameter ￿ is the (absolute value of) own price demand elasticity,
while ￿c is the cross price elasticity of demand. The parameter η is the elas-
ticity of demand with respect to quality, and ηc is the cross quality elasticity
of demand. Then, goods are gross complements if
￿c < 0, ηc > 0,
while goods are gross substitutes if
￿c > 0, ηc < 0.
4Because monopolists produce in the elastic portion of the demand curve, we
require that ￿ > 1. We also require that η > 0; the elasticity of goods’
demand with respect to own quality is positive. For the model to yield
meaningful equilibrium prices and qualities, it must also be true that
￿ − η − 1 > 0,
￿ − ￿c − η − ηc − 1 > 0.
These assumptions guarantee that ﬁrms’ maximization problems are well
deﬁned and produce strictly positive markups when autonomous and when
merged, respectively. Solving equation (2) for price gives a locus describing
the proﬁt maximizing price for any given quality
pp =
(￿ − δ￿c)(c + css)
￿ − δ￿c − 1
. (5)
The subscript p identiﬁes (5) as the locus describing p,s combinations
consistent with proﬁt maximizing prices. We may also solve (3) for optimal
price, which after some rearranging gives the following equation, describing
optimal quality for a given price




The subscript s identiﬁes locus (6) as that which describes proﬁt max-
imizing quality consistent with a given price. Thus, our assumptions have
allowed us to study the merger problem using the same methodology Spence
(1975) applied to studying the quality and price decisions of monopolists. In
ﬁgure 1, we plot both loci in s,p space, assuming that ﬁrms are autonomous
so that δ = 0. The point of intersection shows ﬁrms’ autonomous proﬁt
maximizing prices and qualities. Varying the parameter δ between zero and
one allows us to see how merger shifts the pp and the ps locus.
For some shifts of the two loci, it is obvious that welfare is increased by the
merger. For example, if the shifts result in a post merger intersection of the
pp and ps locus in the lower right hatched box, we may immediately conclude
that the merger has increased welfare. This follows from the fact that the
merger is an unambiguous gain from the perspective of the consumer; higher
quality and lower price.9 If however, merger shifts the two loci so that the
9Because there is perfect information, it is impossible in our model for merger to de-
crease proﬁts and make ﬁrms worse oﬀ. Thus, we may conclude that joint proﬁts are
always increased by merger.
5new intersection lies to the northwest of the original intersection, the result
is an unambiguous loss from the perspective of consumer as prices are higher
and quality lower. We must then compare consumers’ surplus and ﬁrms’
joint proﬁts to fully assess the impact of merger.
To gain some insight into how merger alters the picture presented in
ﬁgure 1, we substitute δ = 1 into (5) and (6) and re-plot the pp and ps loci.
Figure 2 illustrates some possibilities when goods are complements (￿c < 0,
ηc > 0). Inspection of (5) and (6) indicate that merger shifts both loci to
the right (recall that products are complements when ￿c < 0 and ηc > 0).
The outward shift of the pp locus captures the idea that merger allows for
the internalization of the negative demand externality a high price imposes
on the other ﬁrm. Similarly, the ps locus shifts out because ﬁrms internalize
the positive demand externality generated by production of quality, and after
merger wish to produce a higher quality for any given price.
Figure 2 shows that the internalization of cross demand eﬀects may result
in higher quality and price, higher quality and lower price, or lower quality
and price. We shall elucidate which cases are likely to occur for diﬀerent
elasticities in the subsequent section.
The impact of merger when ﬁrms produce substitute products (￿c > 0,
ηc < 0) is described in ﬁgure 3. In this case, merger shifts both loci back.
The merged ﬁrms now have a tendency to charge higher price and produce a
lower quality than before. The result may be higher quality and higher price,
lower quality and higher price, or lower quality and lower price. In contrast
to the typical analysis of horizontal merger, however, it is only in the case in
which quality falls and price rises that a loss in consumers’ surplus is obvious.
Under which market conditions might we expect the various scenarios
described in ﬁgures 2 and 3 to occur? Solving equations (2) and (3) simulta-
neously for equilibrium prices and qualities as functions of cost parameters,











cs(￿ − δ￿c − η − δηc − 1)
. (8)
Let the subscript m distinguish prices and qualities when ﬁrms are merged,
and the subscript a distinguish prices and qualities when ﬁrms are not merged.
6Substituting δ = 0 and δ = 1 into (7), we ﬁnd that the change in price due
to merger, ∆p, is
∆p = pm − pa =
c(￿c(1 + η) + ηc￿)
(￿ − ￿c − η − ηc − 1)(￿ − η − 1)
. (9)
By substituting δ = 0 and δ = 1 into (8), we ﬁnd that the change in
quality due to merger, ∆s, is
∆s = sm − sa =
c((￿ − 1)ηc + η￿c)
cs(￿ − ￿c − η − ηc − 1)(￿ − η − 1)
. (10)
We then may compute the percentage change in price and quality due to
merger as:
%∆p =
￿c(1 + η) + ηc￿




(￿ − 1)ηc + η￿c
(￿ − ￿c − ηc − η − 1)η
. (12)
Both %∆p or %∆s may be positive or negative for both the case in
which goods are complements and the case in which goods are substitutes.
The size and direction of the eﬀect depends on the relative magnitudes of














Not surprisingly, higher own-price elasticity lessens relative changes in price
due to merger. This is because any change in price results in a more profound
change in product demand. Similarly, higher own-quality elasticity increases
relative changes in price due to merger. Intuitively, this is because ﬁrms face
strong incentives to improve product quality, and improvements in quality
are followed by increases in price. These results do not depend upon whether














Increases in any of the cross elasticities result in larger percentage changes
in price and quality when merger occurs.10 Figures 4 and 5 aid in describing
what these results on the cross quality elasticities mean in practical terms.
Figure 4 plots percentage changes in price and quality as functions of
cross price and qualities elasticities for the case in which products are gross
complements (ηc > 0,￿c < 0). The ﬁgure shows how the ultimate result
of merger varies with cross price and cross quality elasticities. The upper
part of ﬁgure 4 plots the percentage change in price and quality as functions
of the cross quality elasticity, ηc. This part of the diagram shows that, as
the cross quality elasticity of products increases, it becomes more likely that
merger increases both price and quality. Similarly, the lower half of the
diagram implies that as the cross price elasticity decreases (that is, becomes
more negative or increases in absolute value), it is more likely that merger
decreases both price and quality.
The intuition behind ﬁgure 4 is as follows. If goods are strong quality
complements in the sense that ηc is large, prior to merger ﬁrms are producing
insuﬃcient quality, so that when they merge, the internalization of the cross
quality externality results in higher product qualities. The price increase
follows from the increase in marginal cost associated with the quality increase.
The lower half of the diagram reﬂects the fact that if goods are strong price
complements in the sense that ￿c is large in absolute value, the issue of
overriding importance to ﬁrms when merged is lowering product prices. To
achieve a lower price, ﬁrms must also lower marginal costs of production.
This requires a decrease in product quality.
Figure 4 also provides some initial clues into the welfare impact of merger
when the products are complementary. We can, for example, say that an
unambiguous welfare increase is possible for balanced cross price and cross
quality elasticities. The vertical dashed lines on each diagram demarcate an
area in which the percentage change in quality is positive while the percentage
change in price is negative. This is a win-win situation from the perspective
10A clariﬁcation: since it is the case for complements that ￿c < 0, it may help to think of
the percentage change in price or quality getting larger as the absolute value of the cross
price elasticity gets smaller.
8of consumers; it may occur when cross quality and cross price elasticities
are neither too large or too small so that ﬁrms have balanced incentives to
both lower price and increase quality when merged. Since in these cases
merger unambiguously increases consumers’ surplus, it must also increase
social welfare.
Figure 5 displays the case in which the ﬁrms produce substitute products
(ηc < 0,￿c > 0); this case is the most similar to the horizontal merger com-
monly analyzed in the literature. The lower portion of Figure 5 indicates
that as the cross quality elasticity grows more negative, ﬁrms are more likely
to both reduce quality and price when merged. This somewhat surprising
result occurs because reduction in competition associated with horizontal
merger allows ﬁrms to produce lower product quality when merged. Thus,
the merger produces downward pressure on price due to lower marginal pro-
duction costs, and this pressure may override the incentives ﬁrms have to
increase price when merged. The area between the vertical dashed lines on
ﬁgure 5 delineate a region in which the desire of the merged entity to ease
competition by reducing qualities and increase prices results in a lose-lose
situation for consumers, because for these elasticities, ﬁrms lower increase
prices yet lower quality after merger. In these cases, we must therefore resort
to comparison of proﬁts gained and surplus lost to assess whether or not
merger increases or decreases welfare.
The chief lesson that we may draw from these diagrams is that allowing
ﬁrms to vary product quality may result in very diﬀerent outcomes than in
the usual model in which quality is (implicitly) taken as given. In contrast
to the conventional wisdom, it is entirely possible that merging ﬁrms pro-
ducing gross complements might increase their prices and ﬁrms producing
gross substitutes might decrease their prices. We now turn to investigating
in more detail the implications of these results for consumers’ surplus and
total societal welfare.
2.1 Consumer surplus, demand and welfare
In this section we develop a more thorough assessment of the relationship
between price, quality, and merger. Our assessment is based upon com-
puting thresholds for percentage changes in price. We compute the highest
percentage price change a consumer would be willing to accept, given a per-
centage change in quality. We may then take the change in quality induced
by merger, and compare the acceptable price change with the price change
9that actually occurs when the ﬁrms merge. An advantage of our methodol-
ogy (beyond tractability) is that it is also ﬂexible in that it allows us to take
into account a variety of diﬀerent types of consumer preferences.
A ﬁrst challenge is developing a simple representation of consumer pref-
erences capturing the most relevant features of the problem. Capturing
the essential reason Spence (1975) found ﬁrms’ quality choices diverge from
welfare-maximizing choices - the diﬀerence between marginal and total con-




x1(˜ p1,p2,s1,s2)d˜ p1 +
Z ∞
p2
x2(˜ p2,p1,s2,s1)d˜ p2, (13)
and social welfare is
W = CS + π1 + π2. (14)
Substituting (13) and (1) into (14) and diﬀerentiating with respect to
price and quality (respectively) yields, respectively, the conditions describing
welfare maximizing prices and quality:
Wi,pi = xi,pi(pi − ci) +
xj,pi(pj − cj) +
R ∞
p2 xj,pid˜ pj = 0. (15)
Wi,si = xi,pi(pi − ci) + xic0
i +
xj,si(pj − cj) +
R ∞
pi xi,sid˜ pi +
R ∞
pj xj,sid˜ pj = 0. (16)
Expressions (15) and (16) diﬀer from (3) and (2) regardless of whether or
not δ = 1 or δ = 0. Whether autonomous or merged, ﬁrms do not generally
produce socially desirable quality or charge socially desirable prices. The
divergence between proﬁt maximizing and welfare maximizing behavior can
be attributed to three factors:
1. Mark-up pricing: Firms have a degree of market power and thus charge
a price greater than marginal cost.
2. The importance of total consumer valuation of quality: Firms consider
the impact of quality on the marginal consumer, while welfare maxi-
mization requires consideration of the impact of quality changes on all
consumers.
103. Demand interdependency: The quality and price of one product inﬂu-
ences the demand for the other product.
These sources of divergence can be roughly related to the ﬁrst-order con-
ditions describing welfare maximizing quality and price choices term by term.
Compare ﬁrst equation (15) with equation (2). An xi term is present in equa-
tion (2) that is absent in equation (15). This reﬂects the standard markup
over marginal cost. In the case in which δ = 1 (the ﬁrms are merged) the
condition for welfare maximizing price under merger, equation (15), contains
the additional term
R ∞
p2 xj,pid˜ pj. The fact that this term is omitted in the
determination of merged ﬁrms’ optimal price is due to the fact that the ﬁrm
neglects the impact of price decisions on the total surplus consumers realize
in consuming the related product. This can be seen as a combination of the
importance of total quality valuation and demand interdependency from our
list above.
Compare now the conditions describing proﬁt maximizing and welfare
maximizing quality: (3) and (16), respectively. Two integral terms appear
in (16) that do not appear in (3). This disparity is due to the importance
of total quality valuation, which is perhaps the most unfamiliar of the ﬁrms’
incentive problems. As Spence (1975, p. 420) writes, ”This aspect of market
failure has very little to do with monopoly. It is, rather, a result of the fact
that price signals carry marginal information, while averages or totals are
required in locating the optimum.” When choosing qualities, ﬁrms consider
how demand is impacted by quality at the margin, but do not consider how
quality inﬂuences the utility of all consumers.
In consideration of this last source of divergence from welfare-maximizing
quality choice, we wish to adopt functional forms for demand that do allow
for some divergence in average and marginal utility. Most demand functions
that allow this divergence are diﬃcult to work with.11 We employ a simple
device to capture this feature of the model: a log-linear demand function














j , pi < p.
11Linear or log-linear demand functions do not allow a diﬀerence between marginal and
average willingness to pay for quality. The most popular alternative, employed by Spence
(1975) and also Dixit (1979), is to employ a function such as d = p￿(s)sη, so that price
elasticity is constant for any given quality, yet varies with quality. For our purposes, this
function is still too diﬃcult to use.
11The log-linear demand function (17) allows for a change in willingness to
pay for the good at the point p, but otherwise retains all characteristics of
the demand function used in the previous section. It shall allow us to track
the divergence in average and marginal valuation using the sole parameter
k. Figure 6 shows the shape of the demand function and how it changes for
diﬀering values of k. For k = 1, marginal and average quality valuation are
the same. In this case the demand function has no kink. If k > 1, the demand
function ﬂattens out above the kink, implying that the average willingness to
pay for quality of is less than marginal willingness to pay. Thus, in this case,
by focusing on the marginal consumer, ﬁrms overstate the impact of quality
on consumers’ surplus. If k < 1, the average willingness to pay for quality is
greater than willingness to pay of the marginal consumer. In this case, ﬁrms
understate the impact of quality by focusing on only the marginal consumer.
Because the positioning of the kink in demand is arbitrary, we might as
well position it to greatest advantage. It is most useful to position the kink
at the pre-merger price, and assume that ﬁrms ignore the possibility of the
kink when choosing price and quality and that it does not eﬀect ﬁrms’ proﬁts.
In ﬁgure 6, if p1 is the pre merger price, we position the kink at p1. In the
appendix, we show that performing these operations lead us to the following








We may solve (17) as follows, using as before %∆p and %∆s to denote




￿k − 1 − ￿c
%∆s (18)
Equation (18) describes a relationship between percentage changes in quality
and percentage changes in prices such that consumer welfare is unchanged,
given the change in the shape of the demand curve. Using this expression, we
can assess whether or not merger increases or decreases consumers’ surplus.
If we insert a value for %∆s into (18) we obtain the price change which leaves
consumers indiﬀerent between pre and post merger prices and qualities. That
is, we obtain the price change that consumers are willing to tolerate, given
the change in quality induced by merger. It follows that any percentage price
12increase greater than this standard reduces consumer welfare, while any price
increase lower than this increases consumer welfare.
In similar fashion, in the appendix we also derive an iso-social welfare line
that describes the price change given the change in quality due to merger that








Rearranging gives the following expression:
%∆p
∗∗ =
￿(η + ηc) + ηc(￿k − 1)
(￿k − 1)(￿ + ￿c) − ￿￿c
%∆s (20)
In ﬁgure 7 we plot the acceptable price increases from the perspective
of consumers (labelled ∆CS = 0), and the acceptable price increases from
a social welfare perspective (∆SW = 0) given that k = 1, so there is no
divergence between the marginal willingness to pay for quality and the aver-
age willingness to pay for quality. The change in quality is omitted to avoid
cluttering the diagrams unnecessarily; the reader may refer to ﬁgures 4 and 5
to see associated percentage changes in quality. The ﬁgure shows, as the pre-
vious ﬁgures did, that increasing the cross quality elasticity of the products
generally results in greater percentage changes in price when merger occurs
(because quality has improved; see ﬁgure 4).
For all points up to the vertical dotted line, which marks the point at
which the ∆SW = 0 line intersects the %∆p line, welfare is improved by
merger. This is because for all other points on the diagram, the actual price
change provoked by merger is below the constant welfare price change, mean-
ing that prices either increase less or fall more than the minimum needed to
hold welfare constant. This result is interesting in that it implies that a rel-
atively large cross quality demand elasticity may result in merger decreasing
welfare, even though intuition might suggest that in a case when ﬁrms have
strong incentives to upgrade quality when merged, welfare should increase
when ﬁrms merge.
The lower half of ﬁgure 7 plots the same three percentage changes as func-
tions of the cross price elasticity is allowed to vary. Figure 7 indicates that
as the cross price elasticity gets larger (becomes more negative) and goods
become stronger price complements, the likelihood that merger increases wel-
fare increases. This is true because ﬁrms have a strong incentive to lower
prices when merged.
13This analysis reveals an interesting fact about mergers in which goods are
complementary and product quality may change due to merger. One may
conclude that it is most likely that, given there is no divergence in marginal
and total willingness to pay for quality, merger may result in a decrease in
welfare when goods are complements if the cross quality demand elasticity
is large, and the cross price elasticity is small. To review, the intuition is
as follows. When the cross quality elasticity of demand is large, ﬁrms have
an incentive to greatly increase quality when merged; this also leads to a
corresponding increase in prices. If the cross price elasticity is suﬃciently
small, the price increase resulting from the change in the quality may be
large enough to swamp the welfare gains due to the quality change.
Perhaps the chief lesson provided by the diagram is that increases in
product quality associated with merger do not necessarily indicate that a
merger has increased welfare. Indeed, it is possible that merger may result
in reduction of product quality, but that this will result in higher welfare due
to the associated fall in prices. It is also possible that merger may decrease
welfare when product quality increases. This is because the increase in price
associated with higher product quality oﬀsets the beneﬁts consumers realize
from higher product quality.
How does this picture change when some divergence between average and
marginal willingness to pay for quality is allowed? Recall that in our speciﬁ-
cation described by (19) a higher k means that average valuation of quality
is lower than marginal valuation of quality. Figure 8 plots the percentage
change in price and the constant welfare price changes for diﬀerent values
of k. As k gets larger, the constant welfare line ﬂattens out. Not surpris-
ingly, when the “average” consumer places lower value on quality, consumers
are, ceteris paribus, less willing to tolerate price increases. This eﬀectively
expands the range for which mergers decrease welfare. The opposite is true
if k < 1, the average consumer beneﬁts more than the marginal consumer
from an increase in quality. Thus, consumers in general are more willing to
tolerate price increases. As the k < 1 line on Figure 8 indicates, it is possible
that this eﬀect can be strong enough to result in any merger between ﬁrms
producing complementary products increasing welfare.
Figure 9 shows the essential aspects of merger when goods are substi-
tutes and k is allowed to vary. The distinguishing feature of Figure 9 is that
the welfare constant price change now generally lies below the actual price
change, meaning that merger usually results in price changes given qual-
ity changes, that reduce welfare. However, in tandem the upper and lower
14portion of ﬁgure 9 reveal that, unlike the typical case of horizontal merger,
merger between ﬁrms producing substitute products that may vary prod-
uct quality can produce welfare increases. This outcome may occur when
the cross quality elasticity is relatively large (in this case negative), and the
cross price elasticity is relatively small. In this case, ﬁrms do not face a
strong incentive to increase price and decrease quality when merged. It is
possible then, that a simultaneous drop in quality and price occurs which
decreases welfare. Thus, there are cases of horizontal merger which increase
welfare, but they correspond to falling quality and prices.
If k is allowed to vary for the case of substitutes, the results do not change
profoundly and are roughly as expected. Smaller k implies a greater average
willingness to pay for quality changes than marginal willingness to pay. The
eﬀect is most pronounced for the case in which quality falls, where previously
a welfare increase had been possible. Here, the resulting quality drop means
that consumers must be compensated by a larger price drop, rendering an
improvement in welfare less likely.
3 Conclusions
This paper has examined the impact of merger in situations in which ﬁrms
are free to choose both product qualities and prices. We show that, contrary
to the standard case of horizontal merger in which product quality is given,
merger between ﬁrms producing gross complements may decrease welfare,
and mergers between ﬁrms producing substitute products (the classic hori-
zontal merger case) may increase welfare. When the cross quality elasticity
of demand is high, and the cross price elasticity of demand is low, merger
between ﬁrms producing complementary products may induce quality and
price increases that reduce welfare. Similarly, in the case in which ﬁrms pro-
duce substitute products, welfare may induce quality and price declines that
increase welfare. We also ﬁnd that in some cases welfare and quality move
in opposite directions. For example, in the case in which ﬁrms produce gross
complements, it is possible that ﬁrms increase quality when merged, but that
this change lowers consumer welfare. Additionally, in the case in which ﬁrms
produce substitutes, it is possible that ﬁrms decrease quality, but that this
change increases consumer welfare.
Our results have some important implications for policy when quality
choice is important. Our results suggest that one must exercise caution in
15assessing arguments that merger should be allowed to occur because the
merged entity will produce higher quality products.
There are many ways in which one might extend our analysis. First, one
might wish to include in our model some of the other reasons for merger
considered in the literature: an obvious idea is to include in the analysis the
possibility that merger increases eﬃciency in some way, so that the merged
entity faces lower production costs than the independent ﬁrms. This would
lead to an assessment of merger which combined our analysis of merger with
the classic ”eﬃciency” analysis of merger. Another way in which others
might build upon our model is by introducing an asymmetry in the quality
and price dependency between ﬁrms.
16Appendix - Derivation of Iso Surplus Lines
In this appendix, we describe the derivation of an iso consumers’ surplus
line when the demand function is discontinuous. The demand functions are
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Taking the total diﬀerential of CS with respect to p and s, applying
symmetry, and allowing p to approach p, the price which shall be used in
forming calculations, we arrive at the following expression describing the








To test whether or not dCS > 0 after merger, we can employ the price
and quality changes, ∆p in (9) and ∆s in (10), respectively, as estimates of
dp and ds in (17). The term is converted into percentage change terms by
substituting in either pm,sm or pa,sa for p and s. We shall generally use the
price and quality combination with the larger price in the above. If we did
not do this, the point at which the demand curve changed slope would have
to enter into ﬁrms’ decision making process.
Alternatively, we can develop an iso welfare line by applying the same
methodology, but this time to the expression:
SW = CS + x1(p1 − c1(s1)) + x2(p2 − c2(s2)),
where we use the speciﬁed demand functions given in (4). Taking the total
diﬀerential of SW with respect to prices and qualities, applying symmetry,
17letting p approach p, substituting in the equilibrium prices and qualities
described by (7) and (8), and making cancellations gives the following ex-
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Figure 4: Percentage changes in quality and price due to merger as functions









Figure 5: Percentage changes in quality and price due to merger as functions





k = 1 k < 1
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Figure 8: Percentage change in price due to merger, with equal welfare per-













Figure 9: Percentage change in price due to merger, with equal welfare per-
centage changes in price: case of substitutes
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